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Since 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) has undergone profound 
constitutional changes, dictated by the geographic and functional expansion of the EU, but 
also by the need to heal its original sin: the “democratic deficit”.  
Despite these innovations, the “democratic deficit” still exists as a deficiency with 
regard to “input legitimacy”, i.e. as a “discrepancy between the pervasive effects of the 
regulative power of the EU and the weak authorization of this power through the citizens 
of the Member States who are specifically affected by those regulations”.  
Even though the democratic value of the involvement of people and civil society in 
decision-making remains contentious, more than a decade after the publication of the 2001 
White Paper on European Governance, the method of increasing “input legitimacy” still 
means the improvement of citizens’ participation, in compliance with Art. 11 TEU. 
This essay, building on the extensive academic scholarship on participatory democracy, 
discusses channels for citizen and civil society participation in the EU. It attempts to 
critically contrast and compare formal participatory tools, i.e. those provided for in the 
Treaties or regulated by secondary EU legislation, with soft or informal channels (e.g. 
consultation, work fora, platforms) for citizens’ involvement and their actual contribution 
in terms of “input legitimacy.” In particular, drawing inspiration from Smismans’ discourse 
on “decentralism”, this essay confronts the issue of multifold horizontal (non-territorial) 
participation, focusing on the involvement of CSOs, i.e. of transnational, non-territorial 
“organisational structures whose members have objectives and responsibilities that are of 
general interest and who also act as mediators between the public authorities and citizens”, 
as well as multi-level territorial (vertical) dimensions of participation. It then contrasts the 
role of (horizontally or vertically) organized civil society’s participation with the 
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1. Introductory Remarks 
 
Since 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) has undergone profound 
constitutional changes. The “institutional triangle” composed of the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament (EP), already enshrined in the foundational Treaties, 
has remained intact. However, the architecture and practice of EU governance have been 
substantially modified. These changes have been dictated by the geographic and functional 
expansion of the EU, but also by the need to heal its original sin: the “democratic deficit”.  
David Marquand first used the term “democratic deficit” in 1970 (Mény 2003). Then, 
for over forty years, scholars, jounalists and politicians have claimed that the EU suffers 
from such a deficit, making it an ambiguous cliché (Pech 2008: 93), but the substance of the 
“democratic deficit”, its profound reasons and the ways to eliminate it have been 
differently theorized.I The “democratic deficit” has mostly been identified as a disjunction 
between power and electoral accountability (Craig 2011: 30) or, as recently expressed by 
Raphaël Kies and Patrizia Nanz, is primarily (although not exclusively) conceived as the 
“discrepancy between the pervasive effects of the regulative power of the EU and the weak 
authorization of this power through the citizens of the Member States who are specifically 
affected by those regulations” (Kies and Nanz 2013: 1). This essay embraces this view and 
contends that the “democratic deficit” denotes a lack of procedural or “input legitimacy” 
(Scharpf 1999: 7), which can be identified as the participatory quality of the procedure 
leading to laws and rules as ensured by the “majoritarian” institutions of electoral 
representation.II 
The EU has explored different and complementary strategies to reduce the 
abovementioned “discrepancy” and to improve its input legitimacy. The relative weakness 
of the EP, which is the only directly legitimated European institution, has progressively 
been reduced. The Lisbon Treaty has further increased the EP’s power in the law-making 
process through the extension of both the co-decision procedure, renamed “ordinary 
legislative procedure”, and the political control over the Commission (Lupo and Fasone 
2012). In addition, the Lisbon Treaty has given formal recognition to national parliaments’ 
contribution to “the good functioning of the Union” (Art. 12 of the Treaty on European 
Union, TEU). It has also provided for an involvement of national parliamentarians in the 
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ordinary legislative procedure through the “Early Warning System”, whereby national 
parliaments are to check for and enforce compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in 
EU legislative proposals.III  
The expansion of the EP’s competences and the enhanced role of national parliaments 
went hand in hand with the development of various forms of participatory democracy.IV In 
line with a global trend, the EU has made the participation of civil society to in the decision 
making process a key objective of its action and a constitutional principle (Cuesta López 
2010; Ferri 2012).  
In 2001, participation was recognized as one of the pillars of “good governance” in the 
notorious Commission White Paper on European Governance (hereinafter “White 
Paper”).V The White Paper highlighted the importance of a wide participation throughout 
the whole policy chain to ensure the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies. 
That same year, Declaration No. 23 on the future of the Union annexed to the Treaty of 
Nice addressed the democratic challenge of the EU and acknowledged “the need to 
improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its 
institutions, in order to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States”. Finally, 
even though, in line with the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) case law,VI 
the Lisbon Treaty affirms that the EU is founded on representative democracy,VII it also 
introduced several references to participation. Art. 10(3) TEU explicitly recognizes that 
“every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union”. Art. 
11 TEU makes clear that the EU institutions must give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas 
of EU action and that they must “maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society”. Furthermore, Art. 11(3) TEU adds a legal 
dimension to the existing and extensive practice of consulations by providing that the 
European Commission “shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order 
to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent”. Art. 11(4) TEU provides 
for the European Citizen Initiative, and confers to EU citizens the power of inviting the 
European Commission to present a legislative proposal. Art. 15 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also mentions civil society and prescribes that 
“in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
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Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as 
possible”. 
Despite these innovations, the EU is still a democratically legitimate entity with 
democratic shortcomings (Pech 2008: 94).  
On the one hand, the conferral of larger powers on the EP and national parliaments 
has been accompanied by the consolidation of intergovernmentalism in a sort of 
“schizophrenic” institutional evolution (Dehousse and Magnette 2006: 33). On the other 
hand, the overall idea of solving the “input legitimacy” problem by giving more powers to 
the EP “rests on a fallacious analogy with the institutions of parliamentary democracy at 
the national level” (Majone 2010: 151). Regardless of contrary predictions advanced by EU 
Commissioner Viviane Reading,VIII the EU is not a state (not even a quasi-federation or 
federation in statu nascendi) (Sadurski 2013: 43). EU democracy is not founded on the 
principle of popular sovereignty, usually proclaimed in national constitutions and inspired 
by the social contract tradition. The German Constitutional Court, in its renowned decision 
of 30 June 2009 on the constitutional profile of the Treaty of Lisbon and its ratification in 
Germany, clearly stated that, even with the new Treaty, the EU retains its identity as a 
complex organisation, its character of Staatenverbund.IX  
Moreover, there is a growing disaffection with supranational integration, well shown by 
a declining turnout in European elections. This negative trend, likely to be confirmed in the 
forthcoming 2014 vote, can be explained by the fact that the process of political 
representation does not operate properly within a supranational context (Cuesta López 
2010: 123; Monaghan 2012: 290). Therefore, the more general concern of representative 
democracy in the national context can be seen as an additional factor of poor participation 
in the European elections (Cassese 2012: 606). From this perspective, the enhanced role of 
national parliaments does not represent a solution to the “democratic deficit”, as defined 
above.  
Even though the democratic value of the involvement of people and civil society in 
decision-making remains contentious, more than a decade after the publication of the 
White Paper, the main method of increasing “input legitimacy” is still the improvement of 
citizens’ participation, and the implementation of Art. 11 TEU. 
Building on the extensive academic scholarship on participatory democracy in the EU, 
this contribution aims to discuss, in light of Art. 11 TEU, the channels for citizen and civil 
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society participation in EU governance. For the purpose of this analysis, participation is the 
deliberative process by which interested or affected individual citizens and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) are involved in decision-making processes before a political decision 
is taken (Inter alia Alemanno 2014; Mendes 2011a; Nanz and Dalferth 2010).  
Drawing inspiration from Smismans’ discourse on “decentralism” (Smismans 2004),X 
this essay confronts multifold horizontal (non-territorial) participation, focusing on the 
involvement of CSOs, i.e. transnational “organisational structures whose members have 
objectives and responsibilities that are of general interest and who also act as mediators 
between the public authorities and citizens”, as well as multi-level territorial (vertical) 
dimensions of participation. It then compares the role of (horizontally or vertically) 
organized civil society participation with the participatory role of EU citizens uti singuli. 
Having characterized the democratic deficit as a “weak authorization” of EU powers, this 
contribution also aims to evaluate how different forms of citizen involvement contribute to 
foster “input legitimacy.” 
First, the role of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC, or simply the 
“Committee”) is examined (Section 2), then informal mechanisms for CSO participation 
are analysed (Section 3). This analysis does not include new modes of governance (e.g. the 
Open Method of Coordination), and does not consider the participation of civil society 
within EU agencies (although agencies have put in place interesting participatory channels). 
Second, this essay discusses the multi-level territorial (vertical) dimension of participation, 
focusing on the involvement of regions and other sub-national entities in EU governance, 
in particular the role of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) (Section 4). It then examines 
the role of EU citizens uti singuli regardless of their territorial belonging (Section 5).XI 
Finally, a few concluding remarks are provided. 
 
2. The Role of  the European Economic and Social Committee in 
enhancing Civil Society Organizations’ Participation 
 
The involvement of trans-nationally organized civil society occurs mainly through a 
permanent and institutionalised advisory body, the EESC, and through informal channels. 
This section focuses on the EESC, highlighting its features as a transnational participatory 
forum, trying to infer whether the EESC is likely to increase the EU’s “input legitimacy”.  
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It is well known that the EESC was created by the Treaty of Rome as a body with 
advisory functions, and that it still maintains its character as advisory body composed of 
members of the civil society. Currently, according to Article 300(2) TFEU, the EESC 
consists of representatives of organisations of employers and employees as well as of other 
representatives of civil society, notably from socio-economic, civic, professional, and 
cultural areas. Since Croatia has joined the EU in 2013, the EESC has 353 members drawn 
from economic and social interest groups, nominated by national governments and 
appointed by the Council of the European Union (Art. 302 TFEU). The EESC’s members 
are divided into three main groups: (I) employers’ organisations; (II) trade unions; and (III) 
various interests. The Employers’ Group brings together businesspersons and 
representatives of entrepreneurs and associations working in industry, commerce, services 
and agriculture in the Member States. The Workers’ Group comprises representatives from 
national trade unions, confederations and sectorial federations, the vast majority of them 
affiliated with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).XII In line with Art. 300 
TFEU, Group III is made up of “other representatives and stakeholders of civil society, 
particularly in the economic, civic, professional and cultural field”. The wide formulation of 
this provision implies the involvement of a large variety of categories: farmers’ 
organisations, small businesses, the crafts sector, the professions, social economy actors 
(mutual societies, cooperatives, foundations and non-profit associations), consumer 
organisations, environmental organisations, and associations representing the family, 
women and gender equality issues, youth, minority and underprivileged groups, persons 
with disabilities, the voluntary sector and the medical, legal, scientific and academic 
communities.XIII Group III seems to mirror the increased complexity of contemporary 
society, including a patchwork of minority interests. 
Although the members of the EESC are nominated by national governments and 
appointed by the Council of the European Union, the territorial dimension remains 
“hidden” in the EESC’s internal organization. National groups are disaggregated and re-
aggregated on the basis of the interests they represent. Fascinatingly, the EESC includes 
business interests alongside “weaker interests” and/or “non-economic interests”, in line 
with a trend well established at the national level.XIV 
One could argue that the EESC is a representative body in the sense that it represents 
citizens’ interests (even though it is not elected). By contrast, we include it in the 
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participatory discourse: as mentioned above, this body is an institutional setting for CSOs 
to participate in the EU governance. According to Article 304 TFEU, the EESC must be 
consulted by the EP, by the Council or by the Commission where the Treaties so provide, 
or in all cases in which they consider it appropriate. In addition, the Committee may issue 
an opinion on its own initiative. Hönnige and Panke (2013: 454) underline that the EESC 
is consulted in nearly all market-creating and market-correcting policies (which include 
areas such as the internal market, environment and sustainable development, agriculture, 
employment, social policy, cohesion policy, youth and education, vocational training, 
research and innovation, culture, health, transport and energy, consumer policy and trade). 
Legislative proposals are dealt with in six sections (similar to parliamentary committees) 
structured according to connected policy areas. 
Since 1999, when it adopted its own-initiative Opinion on “The role and contribution 
of civil society organisations in the building of Europe”,XV the EESC has claimed to be the 
primary forum of civil society and to play a legitimacy function through the involvement of 
social and economic players to effectively shape EU decisions.XVI Currently, Group III is 
the driver of a more participatory EU: being itself composed of CSOs, it has set itself the 
task of supporting the development and democratic function of CSOs. It should not 
appear naïve that Group III’s motto is “Achieving real participatory democracy in the EU, 
through civil dialogue”.XVII 
Escaping the rethoric which sorrounds EESC’s talks, the EESC is a participatory tool 
in the sense that it allows CSOs to participate in EU decision-making and synthesises 
different components of European society. It plays the role of intermediary between 
citizens and EU institutions. However, even though it is undoubtedly pluralistic, it is not 
open, since members are pre-selected at national level.  
As regard the question whether and how (and how much) the EESC influences the EU 
decision-making process, it is hard to say. Recently, Hönnige and Panke attempted to 
measure, through an empirical analysis, the influence of the EESC and the Committee of 
Regions and concluded that both of them do have influence on policy-making, even 
though their recommendations are not binding on the addressee (Hönnige and Panke 
2013). They nevertheless concluded that this influence is still restricted. 
On 5 February 2014, the EESC has opted to “move closer” to the European 
Parliament and to consolidate its relations with the Committee of the Regions through an 
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inter-institutional agreement.XVIII The aim of this agreement is to reinforce the “democratic 
pillar” of the EU, achieving two objectives: ensuring that legislative action is more 
effective, and making the best possible use of available resources. In practice, the 
agreement should nurture a “cooperation upstream”, through own-initiative opinions, and 
a “downstream” consisting in assessments of the impact of European directives and 
programmes on the ground. The vague idea behind the agreement is to counter-balance the 
weight of the Commission and the Council in the legislative process, and to remedy the 
“weak authorization” of EU powers through the CSOs, i.e. to increase the EU’s “input 
legitimacy”. Indeed, the ambiguous language of this document alludes not only to input 
legitimacy, but also (and probably even more) to output legitimacy. Although it is unclear 
what (legal) effects (if any) the agreement will display, more “visibility” for the EESC 
should produce more intelligent outcomes: by giving the EESC a stronger role in EU 
decision making, EU legislation should benefit from their expertise and information. 
Reading through the text, what is even more evident is the administrative component 
in terms of coordination in translation, research and documentation services. While this 
component is relevant in terms of efficiency and can, to a certain extent, improve 
transparency, it is not per se increasing input legitimacy, nor output legitimacy.  
The enhanced role of the EESC in conjunction with the EP and the Committe of the 
Regions combines all of the institutionalized electoral and non-electoral forms of citizen 
participation. It also encapsulates, in a sort of institutional circle, horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of citizen participation, but it is too early to predict its effects. All we can do is 
to monitor the tangible developments that this agreement will bring about.  
 
3. “Informal” Channels of  Participation for Civil Society Organizations 
 
Art. 11 TEU prescribes that EU institutions must give CSOs the opportunity to make 
known and exchange their views on EU action, as well as maintain within them an open, 
transparent, and regular dialogue. In addition, the Commission must consult parties 
affected by a decision concerned.  
It has been underlined that Art. 11 TEU does not contain a systematic and coherent set 
of norms and seems to be a “shopping list” where the participatory traits of current EU 
governance are included (Mendes 2011b: 1851). This probably is true, but the provision is 
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clear and wide enough to allow the Commission (and other institutions) both to continue 
using well-rooted instruments, such as the “civil dialogue” and consultations, and to 
experiment with other participatory tools.  
Indeed, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, CSOs’ involvement still sticks 
to dialogues and consultation as core channels. In addition, any such involvement is 
primarily a monopoly of the Commission. The reasons behind this monopoly are two-fold.  
First, the Commission has tried to gain in legitimacy itself. As noted by Greenwood, 
“the Commission’s focus on interest groups as potential agents of input legitimacy 
historically developed in the time when the European Parliament was an assembly without 
popular election or extensive powers, when the traditional strengths of interest groups as 
checks and balances on both political institutions, and upon each other, could provide 
another contributory avenue of popular legitimation” (Greenwood 2007: 343). 
 Secondly, the Commission has been the most important target for lobbying activities 
since the very beginning, due in particular to the control of legislative initiative, and it has 
tried to handle the pressure of lobbies through instruments which itself “directs”, such as 
dialogues and consultations (Tasanescu 2009: 55). 
The “civil dialogue” is a practice that the Commission has developed for more than 
two decades. The term “civil dialogue” was coined in 1996 by the Directorate General 
responsible for social policy to plead for increased interaction with CSOs, further to the 
“social dialogue” (with social partners). Whilst the social one has been strongly 
institutionalised since the Maastricht Treaty,XIX the dialogue with other associations was 
envisaged in the Commission’s ‘Plan D’,XX but lacked formal recognition until the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Art. 11 TEU, however, does not give a clear definition 
of “dialogue,” nor does it define its scope, procedures, or players. It has been claimed that 
Art. 11 TEU should imply a certain evolution of current practice: the “civil dialogue” 
should become a widespread participatory channel used by all the institutions and would 
require more openness and clarity (Cuesta López 2010: 132). Even though this opinion can 
be shared, no relevant changes have occurred yet. The Commission continues to engage in 
informal, unregulated dialogues which vary considerably from one DG to another and 
whose effects are quite unclear.  
The EP has also tried to set up civil dialogues, primarily through informal public 
hearings. Annex IX of the Rules of Procedures regulates the access of citizens and 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
67 
members of “interest groups” to the EP and establishes a code of conduct to be respected. 
This internal regulation, however, neither grants regular contacts nor reciprocal 
communication. In addition, it is not clarified what effects these contacts would and should 
bring about. 
The least open of all the EU institutions is still the Council of the European Union. 
Berger, in 2004, noted that CSOs were “kept beyond the crowd control barriers that 
protect Ministerial meetings” (Beger 2004). Only after ten years and in selected sectors only 
have some CSOs (usually from the social sector) occasionally been invited to Council 
meetings to enjoy speaking rights (Cuesta López 2010: 132). 
Consultations, in turn, are soft tools mainly used by the Commission to receive 
technical knowledge and identify the interests and needs of interested parties before 
developing legislative proposals. Analogously to the dialogue(s), they pre-date the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
Consultations are formally open to all stakeholders, interested parties and the wider 
public, allowing for a wide range of actors that include public authorities, businesses, 
associations of different kinds as well as individual citizens, but participation patterns and 
rates vary greatly from one consultation to another. However, Quittkat notes that there are 
also selective consultations which address well defined groups, handle mostly technical 
issues, and are especially used by DG Enterprise and Industry and DG Taxation and 
Customs (Quittckat 2011: 659).  
Currently, in most cases consultations are carried out through an online forum created 
by the Interactive Policy Making (IPM) system.XXI Although online consultations have 
become almost regular instruments, not all DGs use them. The format of these 
consultations can vary considerably, but they often take the form of simple surveys or 
contain questions which are in se conducive to an answer. The impression is that the 
Commission demands approval for decisions which already have been taken, without 
offering adequate space and time to provide meaningful input. Standardized questionnaires 
per se hardly leave room for “qualitative or innovative input”, while flexible formats 
incentivize more complex comments.  
Like dialogues, consultations have not undergone any relevant changes after Lisbon. 
However, there has been a steady and constant move towards a more extensive use of the 
IPM system and a considerable shift towards standardized consultations. As highlighted by 
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Quittkat, “[t]his development bears the risk of emphasizing participation (quantity) at the 
expense of input (quality) as there exists a trade-off between format and participation: the 
more open the format and thus the higher the probability to receive qualitative input, the 
lower the number of participants” (Quittkat 2011: 663). 
From an overall perspective, in comparison to dialogues, consultations seem to 
produce more significant effects and contribute towards shaping a legislative proposal. 
What remains quite unclear is how much single contributions are taken into account (or 
disregarded), and how they are assessed (Quittkat 2011: 661). In addition, there are no legal 
criteria to weigh different contributions and to evaluate the representativeness of CSOs 
(Fazi and Smith 2006: 29). 
A general observation that applies to both dialogues and consultations is that they 
aspire to involve a widespread number of (representative) CSOs in EU decision-making 
processes in view of increasing “input legitimacy”. Nonetheless, they fail to do so primarily 
because they are open and transparent only to a limited extent. 
The composition of civil society that participates in dialogues and consulations at EU 
level is largely dictated by which groups and associations the Commission chooses to fund 
and, often, creates (Sánchez-Salgado 2007). A prominent example of the latter are 
European “platforms”, which are preferred interlocutors in dialogues. These are collective 
subjects composed of umbrella organizations which constitute fora for discussion and 
provide a synthesis of the positions of different actors in a specific field on a named topic. 
Platforms are not themselves participatory tools. Rather, they are networks of CSOs (Ferri 
2012: 522). Indeed, platforms are not directly funded but at the very least incentivised by 
the EU, as the CSOs that form a part of them are heavily subsidized through EU funds. 
The European Social Platform (which is probably the first one to have been established) 
arose from the DG EMP’s activism and was created together with the European 
Parliament with a direct remit to campaign for a European civil dialogue and subsequently 
given an elevated status in funding (Greenwood 2007). Other platforms cover every range 
of activities and subjects: for example, the Platform for Intercultural Europe,XXII the EU 
platform for action on diet, physical activity and health,XXIII or the European Civil Society 
Platform on Lifelong Learning (EUCIS-LLL),XXIV to name but a few. 
In a recently released booklet, Snowdon claims that citizens are not consulted directly, 
“but are instead ventriloquised through NGOs, think tanks and charities which have been 
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hand-picked and financed by the Commission”, and that, in return, these civil society 
groups frequently campaign for the EU to extend its reach into areas of policy in which it 
has no legal competence and lobby for their own budgets (Snowdon 2013).  
The concept of civil society is rooted in the independence from political institutions, 
but truth be told the Commission’s efforts to create a trans-national civil society have 
ended up in undermining CSOs’ very independence.  
Snowdon’s harsh reproach can be reinforced if we consider that there is nothing 
intrinsically democratic about CSOs, that no control on CSOs’ “internal democracy” is 
purported, and that the Commission has never formally (and explicitly) excluded a CSO on 
the basis of its lack of internal democracy.  
This criticism is not even damped by the strong efforts that have been made towards 
increasing transparency trough the “Transparency Register” (TR). The TR was set up in 
2008 by the EP and the Commission through an interinstitutional agreementXXV and 
represents the latest initiative aimed at increasing the transparency of EU-CSOs contacts. It 
fits within the flow of action under the banner of the European Transparency Initiative 
(ETI)XXVI and contains information about organizations “engaged” in the EU decision-
making process. It discloses which interests are being pursued by these organizations and 
what resources are invested in these activities. A Code of Conduct has also been approved 
to regulate communication between the institutions and CSOs. Registrants must agree to 
adhere to the provisions of the Code of Conduct, and breaches of the Code will result in 
an organization being temporary suspended or excluded from the register. 
Greenwood and Dreger note that registration is highly incentivised, and that these 
incentives include “the (in-theory) possibility to exclude non-registered organisations from 
selective consultation meetings, where there are other consultation opportunities (such as 
public consultations) in place; instructions to Commission staff to issue invitations to 
register in meetings; 12 months accreditation for a 1-day access pass to the EP; naming and 
shaming nonregistered organisations; and the option in the Register to sign up to 
consultation alerts for nominated policy fields” (Greenwood and Dreger 2013: 142). 
However, registration remains voluntary and the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency 
and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU)XXVII coalition pointed out earlier this year that 
thousands of organisations remain outside the voluntary lobby register.  
With regard to the civil dialogue, it is unclear whether registration is a significant factor 
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to include a CSO. It is even more uncertain whether a CSO “excluded” from the dialogue, 
because unregistered or for a different reason, might experience some judicial protection. 
The institutions do not have any legal obligation to explain how and why they choose their 
interlocutors. This wide discretion could hardly be challenged in front of the CJEU. In 
addition, since the effect of the dialogue on the actual adoption of an EU act are minimal, 
it is more than unlikely that a CSO excluded from the dialogue challenges the final act in 
front of the Luxembourg judges on the basis of an infringement of Art. 11 TEU. Even in 
the event that a CSO should file such a case, the results are still uncertain. In this respect, it 
is worth recalling that the CJEU has ruled on the principle of democracy in the EU in 
different contexts and perspectives (inter alia Lenaerts 2013). However, it has never focused 
on CSO (or citizens) participation. If we do not consider the series of “Aarhus cases” in 
which in any event the Court had a different focus (and, in general, where the cases arose 
in the context of preliminary rulings), the CJEU came across a CSO’s claim only in 
UEAPME, and only with regard to the social dialogue.XXVIII The CJEU has ruled 
extensively on the right to access to documents, driving general conclusions on the 
principle of transparency, but such case law does not offer a secure basis to ensure 
participation in the manner envisaged in this short contribution. 
Consultations are virtually open, but they end up being dominated by the best 
resourced (regardless of registration), i.e. by those subjects that have been most generously 
financed by the Commission. 
The road to improve the openness and transparency of these participatory tools is also 
the way to make them more effective in terms of increasing input legitimacy and inevitably 
seems to coincide with the enactment of a regulation which defines the procedures and 
rights of participants. This should happen beside a mandatory TR. In this respect, it must 
be noted that the EP Parliament reiterated its support for a mandatory TR several times. In 
February 2014, a few deputies working on the joint transparency register asked the 
European Commission to put forth a proposal to make it mandatory in 2016, after a 
resolution was presented in May 2011.XXIX But the Commission seems reluctant to make 
serious efforts as regards reforming the register and regulating participatory channels, even 
in a mid-term perspective. 
 
 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
71 
4. The Committee of  the Regions 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has given a firmer recognition to sub-national entities. Article 
4(2) TEU states that the EU will “respect regional and local self-government” when 
legislating, and Article 5 TEU refers to the need to consider local and regional 
competences. Under Protocol 2, the Commission is obliged, before proposing a legislative 
act, to take into consideration the regional and local dimensions of the envisaged act, and 
every EU draft legislative act must include an assessment of its potential impact upon local 
and regional levels. But despite the undoubted prominence of sub-national public 
authorities in the post-Lisbon constitutional framework, they are still conceived as 
“vertically” and territorially organized civil society to involve in European governance 
through channels of participation, rather than constitutional entities to include in the 
multilevel institutional decision-making process. These channels of participation are 
consultations and a dictated advisory body, the Committee of the Regions (CoR). 
Quittckat underlines that sub-national communities play a pivotal role in European 
policy formulation via consultation processes: public authorities not only regularly 
participate in consultations, but they are also represented in it through a considerable 
number of associations like Eurocities, the Association of European Border Regions 
(AEBR), the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities or the Local 
Government Association for England and Wales (LGA). 
Despite this involvement in consultations, the Committee of the Regions has looked 
suspiciously upon informal participatory channels and upon a civil dialogue involving 
associations of regional and local authorities, trying to affirm its exclusive legitimacy as 
institutional discussion partner for local and regional authorities of the Union (Smismans 
2003: 485). As a result, sub-national entities’ participation in EU governance (with regard 
to the EU side) is still relatively underdeveloped. 
The CoR was established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty along the model of the 
EESC to strengthen the role of regions and local authorities within the EU decision-
making process, to which they had previously not had access. Art. 13(4) TEU defines the 
role of the CoR as assisting the EU institutions in an advisory capacity. More precisely, the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament must consult the CoR before adopting 
legislation in fields which touch upon local and regional competences. Analogously to the 
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EESC, the CoR can also voluntarily submit opinions in response to the Commission’s 
legislative proposals. The CoR currently has 353 members from all the EU countries, 
appointed for a five-year term by the Council, acting on proposals from the EU Member 
States. The CoR’s members are elected members in local or regional authorities or “key” 
political players in their home region.  
This “mixed” composition is highly questionable because it creates uncertainty and 
internal imbalances. By contrast, it might be perceived as pluralistic and eventually 
(attempts to) mirror constitutional diversity. The internal organization and subdivision into 
political groups according to trans-national party orientations (e.g. the European Peoples 
Party, the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe and the European Alliance) is also questioned. In this respect, 
Hönnige and Panke affirm that the CoR should be considered more as a sort of political 
committee, rather than as a participatory body (Hönnige and Panke 2013: 454). We 
contend, by contrast, that these trans-national political cleavages (as well as the fact that the 
CoR is torn apart into national delegations) do not alter the CoR’s constituency and, 
consequently, do not distort its role as a participatory forum for territorially organized civil 
society. 
Whether or not the CoR increases “input legitimacy” is a challenging question. As 
recalled above, Hönnige and Panke attempted to measure the influence of both the EESC 
and the CoR and concluded that they do have (limited) influence on policy-making. A 
different study, conducted by Neshkova, had already examined how often the Commission 
responded to subnational preferences by incorporating them into EU legislation, and 
arrived more or less at the same conclusions (Neshkova 2010). This author tracked 60 
legislative proposals initiated by the Commission between 1996 and 2007 and estimated the 
change made in response to requests by the CoR. She found that, albeit subnational 
interests influence supranational regulation, this influence is quite unevenly split across 
policy areas. It is quite predictable that the Commission values the Committee’s expertise 
more when it comes to regional issues, but overall it seems that the CoR slightly increases 
the EU’s “input legitimacy”. 
According to Cygan, the CoR might play a more relevant role in the future through the 
assessment of the potential impact of a legislative proposal upon local and regional levels, 
but this does not offer a universal solution for improved legislative legitimacy (Cygan 
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2013). However, a supposed limited impact in terms of “output legitimacy”, such as that 
alluded to by Cygan, does not blur the CoR’s contribution in terms of “input legitimacy”, 
which might also be increased by the abovementioned inter-institutional agreement with 
the EP and the EESC. 
 
5. “Informal” Channels of  Participation for Individual Citizens 
 
As mentioned above, Art. 11(1) TEU obliges the EU institutions to “give citizens and 
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their 
views in all areas of Union action”, and expressly pull citizens and CSOs along.  
Mendes highlights that there is no definition of “public exchange of views”, and no 
clear boundaries can be traced between this exchange and dialogue and consultations, 
respectively provided for in Art. 11(2) and (3) (Mendes 2011b: 1852). Although from the 
legal point of view the difference (if any) between these participatory channels is unclear, it 
can tentatively be affirmed that Art. 11(1) TEU alludes to a patchwork of “soft” 
participatory tools, including consultations which, generally speaking, pre-date the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The “exchange of views” is now ensured through the website “Your Voice in Europe”, 
which is the “European Commission’s ‘single access point’ to a wide variety of 
consultations, discussions and other tools which enable you to play an active role in the 
European policy-making process”.XXX 
As discussed in Section 3, consultations aim to include the interests of the addressees 
of policies and legislations and, although formally open to individual citizens, are 
substantially directed to, and “used” by, CSOs.  
The website section labelled “discussions” redirects to EU blogs and social networks. 
Despite the inviting slogan of the session (“[h]ave your say in debates on the European 
Union and its future, discuss issues directly with leading figures and exchange views with 
other citizens interested in the same topics”), these instruments do not allow for 
participation in the meaning explained in the Introduction. Rather, they are informative 
channels to offer a “window” for looking inside the EU institutions, to know better 
Brussels’ bureaucracy. Citizens may acquire information, but they do not influence the 
decision-making process.  
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The section “Other Tools” redirects to advisory bodies (Committee of the Regions and 
the European Economic and Social Committee) and allows for other tools for contacting 
institutions. One of them is the European Business Test Panel (EBTB),XXXI a panel of 
companies regularly consulted on European Commission policy initiatives. None of these 
tools can be considered participatory, and the EBTB itself is essentially an online platform 
through which companies are required to respond to consultations.  
Beside these online tools, between 2001 and 2009 (before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty) the European Commission, the technocratic body par excellance, has become 
an active advocate of “participatory engineering” (Abels 2009), creating what Mundo Yang 
refers to as Deliberative Citizens Involvement Projects (DCIPs) (Yang, 2013). The 
Commission funded and organized several projects to foster “public exchange of views” 
and, namely, the involvement of individuals. The Commission attempted to test which of 
the wide range of available methodsXXXII would be best suited for transnational and 
multilingual participation. RAISE, a project funded by the European Commission in the 6th 
Framework Programme for Research, brought together 26 citizens from all Member States 
to develop a vision for tomorrow’s city. The participants were to represent the “average 
citizens” from the different countries of Europe and were selected among people who had 
submitted their application to participate through the RAISE website.XXXIII The European 
Citizens Panel on the role of rural areas combined several regional and one pan-European 
citizens panel.XXXIV At the regional level the panels, made up of citizens randomly selected, 
discussed rural questions and formulated recommendations for relevant regional public 
authorities. The panels were supported by the provision of wide-ranging and balanced 
information, supplied at the request of the citizens by witnesses and experts, and by 
professional facilitation of their debates and deliberations.XXXV At the EU level, 87 citizens 
from the regional panels met in Belgium for three days to discuss and debate – each in 
their own language – a large range of European challenges for rural spaces. A similar 
project, “European Citizens’ Panel – New Democratic Toolbox for New Institutions”, was 
conducted by a consortium of CSOs, financed by the Commission, in order to test 
methods of engaging citizens with the European Union.XXXVI 
Most recently, taking into account the previous projects, and probably with the 
intention of more effectively implementing Art. 11(1) TEU, the DG for Communication of 
the European Commission has appointed a consortium of companies to carry out a study 
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on the establishment of a “European House for Civil Society”,XXXVII and to examine 
whether there is a need for such a “space” of participation by EU citizens.XXXVIII The 
survey was completed in January 2014 and, ideally, from 2015 onwards the “European 
House for Civil Society” should be a focal point for citizens and CSOs not yet represented 
in Brussels, and should aim to engage “the unengaged” EU citizens. 
The rather incomplete excursus provided above attempts to show that the soft tools 
available to individual citizens are only to a limited extent “participatory”, and that their 
contribution to the improvement of “input legitimacy” is quite doubtful. The online 
consultations are open to individuals, but are to a large extent a tool used by CSOs. In 
many cases, “ordinary citizens” are not knowledgeable enough to complete the 
questionnaires prepared by the Commission, especially when a consultation concerns niche 
areas or technical issues. Other tools (e.g. EU blogs) constitute a “way to be informed” 
about the EU, but are not participatory channels strictu sensu, as they are not aimed at 
including the will of the people in decision-making and then translate it into political 
decisions.  
The participatory projects are extremely interesting in terms of revitalising democracy 
among EU citizens. However, they highlight the difficulties in transposing, in a 
supranational setting, participatory democracy methods and practices that have been used 
(even succesfully) in local or national contexts. The questions that accompany every 
participatory process appear even more difficult to answer: Who participates? Are the 
participants to be selected randomly or recruited from different societal subgroups? Should 
the participatory arrangement remain open to all those who wish to attend? Should 
regional and local communities be included? How are discussions linked to policy action?  
The fact that these questions are still unanswered is the reason why participatory 
projects represent single and distinct experiments. It is not yet clear whether they can be 
replicated on a larger scale, periodically, and on a broad range of topics. Their costs are 
uncertain and, in times of harsh economic crisis, it is not obvious that such participatory 
processes are sustainable. In addition, the actual influence on the decision-making 
processes by these participatory experiments has been negligible (Boussaguet and 
Dehousse 2002): it is safe to affirm that they have not increased “input legitimacy”. The 
“European House for Civil Society” is more of an idea than a concrete project and it is not 
even clear whether and how it will become a “stable” participatory tool.  




6. The European Citizens’ Initiative 
 
In 2012, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), provided for in Article 11 TEU and 
regulated by Regulation (EU) No. 211/2011 (hereinafter “the Regulation”),XXXIX has 
become a concrete tool for citizens to instigate the adoption of legislation.XL Citizens 
cannot present a proposal to the legislative institutions (i.e. EP and Council), and cannot 
place a proposal directly onto the EU political agenda for debate and decision. However, 
they can request the Commission “to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where 
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing 
the Treaties” (Art. 2(1) of the Regulation). 
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was first provided for in the Draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, and then included in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Art. 11(4) TEU states that “[n]ot less than one million citizens who are nationals of a 
significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European 
Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on 
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties”. 
According to Art. 24 TFEU, “[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting by 
means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the 
provisions for the procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative within the 
meaning of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, including the minimum number 
of Member States from which such citizens must come”. 
On 11 November 2009, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the 
citizens’ initiativeXLI and launched a consultation in view of preparing a legislative proposal. 
Following this public consultation, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Regulation 
on 31 March 2010, which lays down the requirements and the procedure to submit an ECI. 
In February 2011, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 211/2011 
(hereinafter “the Regulation”). Without exploring the content of that Regulation in great 
detail, it suffices here to briefly highlight the main steps to present an ECI. 
The first step is the formation of a sort of multinational “organizing committee”: 
according to Art. 3 of the Regulation the organizers (natural persons who are Union 
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citizens and of the age to be entitled to vote in EP elections) must form “a citizens’ 
committee of at least seven persons who are residents of at least seven different Member 
States”. The organizers must then register their proposed initiative with the Commission 
(Art. 4). The request for registration must specify the title and subject matter of the ECI, its 
objectives, any relevant provisions of the Treaties, and details about both the citizens’ 
committee and their sources of support and funding. Within two months from its receipt, 
the Commission must register the proposed ECI, provided that four conditions are 
satisfied: namely that (a) the citizens’ committee has been formed and its contact persons 
have been duly designated; (b) the proposed citizens’ initiative does not manifestly fall 
outside the framework of the Commission’s powers; (c) the proposed citizens’ initiative is 
not manifestly abusive, frivolous, or vexatious; and (d) the proposed citizens’ initiative is 
not manifestly contrary to the values of the EU (Art. 4(3)). Following a successful 
outcome, the organizers may commence the collection of statements of support from 
individuals entitled to endorse the proposed ECI. All necessary statements of support must 
be collected within a maximum period of 12 months after the registration. The signatories 
of a citizens’ initiative shall come from at least one quarter of Member States (Art. 7). Art. 
8 provides that after collecting the necessary statements of support from signatories, the 
organisers shall submit these statements, in paper or electronic form, to the relevant 
national competent authorities for verification and certification. Having obtained the 
certification, the organizers submit their ECI to the Commission and then have the 
opportunity to present their ECI at a public hearing organized at the European Parliament 
(Art. 11). After that public hearing, and within three months of having received the valid 
submission, the Commission has to “set out in a communication its legal and political 
conclusions on the citizens’ initiative, the action it intends to take, if any, and its reasons 
for taking or not taking that action” (Art. 10(1)(c)).  
The ECI is certainly an open participatory tool. As highlighted by Dougan, the only 
restriction concerns age (Dougan 2011: 1820): “an age threshold was certainly not required 
under Article 11(4) TEU, but it can probably be seen as falling within the Union 
legislature’s discretion under Article 24(1) TFEU”, but doubts have been raised on the 
compatibility of this limit with the principle of non-discrimination (Ferraro, 2011: 282) and, 
in any event, a lower age limit would have been the occasion to involve younger citizens in 
EU governance. The regulation, however, in compliance with the TEU, includes an 
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element which reflects the supranational identity of the EU: signatories must come from at 
least 1/4 of Member States, although no particular geographic or demographic requirement 
is mentioned. According to Article 7(2) of the Regulation, signatories comprise at least the 
minimum number of citizens set out in Annex I to the Regulation and those figures 
correspond to the number of MEPs elected in each Member State multiplied by 750. 
Although scholars highlight the drawbacks of this system of “geographic” (re)distribution, 
it might be argued that no system is perfect and that, regardless of certain imbalances, the 
ECI allows for broad transnational citizen participation. 
Though proceduralized, the ECI is relatively “user-friendly” (Bouza García 2012: 269). 
Criticism has been raised on a few requirements: for example, Szeligowska and Mincheva 
affirm that it is “restrictive, and overly formalistic, to require citizens to choose a particular 
structure for the initiation of an ECI rather than leave them the freedom to organise 
themselves in a different manner” (Szeligowska and Mincheva 2012: 276). These authors 
highlight that it is “overly burdensome and somewhat disproportionate” to conceive this 
organizational structure as a compulsory condition sanctioned by refusal of registration 
(Szeligowska and Mincheva 2012: 273). By contrast, however, the establishment of such a 
committee can be seen as a means of protection from ‘spamming’ and as a tool to prevent 
interest groups from denaturing the ECI (De Witte et al. 2010). 
The concrete impact of the ECI in terms of “input legitimacy” is debatable. The ECI 
allows EU citizens to request the Commission to submit a proposal,XLII and the 
Commission has wide discretion on whether to register a proposed ECI and on whether to 
put forth a proposal. On the one hand, it seems highly unlikely that the Commission 
refuses registration of a proposal on the basis of its substance: the criteria laid down in 
Article 4(2) provide that there must be manifest incompetence of the Commission or that 
the ECI is “manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious” or “manifestly contrary to the 
values of the Union”. It is apparent that Art. 4(2) covers “extreme” situations, in which 
there is an evident contrast between the rationale of the proposal and the objectives and 
the values of the Treaty. On the other hand, it is undeniable that there is no obligation 
whatsoever on the side of the Commission to bring forward any formal proposals based on 
a valid ECI. The Commission might refuse to adopt any concrete action or cherry-pick 
certain elements of the proposed ECI whilst ignoring others, or might even react with 
measures other than those called for by the ECI (Dougan 2011: 1822). However, the fact 
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that the Commission must explain the reasons behind its choices constitutes a vital 
constraint on its discretion and, arguably, the decision of the Commission can also be 
challenged before the Court of Justice under Article 263 TFEU.  
The ECI is “primarily an agenda-setting tool” (Kaufmann 2012), and both EU civil 
servants and CSOs do not expect it to have any meaningful impact on EU affairs and 
regards it as a weak device in terms of its capacity to oblige the Commission to act (Bouza 
García 2012: 259 and 269). At present, this rather pessimistic view cannot be contradicted, 
and whether or not the ECI ultimately strengthens EU democracy will eventually rest on 
how the ECI will be used. Certainly, the procedural warranties that constrain the 
Commission’s discretion seem sufficient to allow the ECI to display its potential and 
contribute to healing the EU’s “democratic deficit”. 
At the end of December 2013, the Commission officially received the first successful 
ECI, with validated support from at least one million European citizens:XLIII the 
“Right2Water ECI” (Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a 
commodity!)XLIV invites the Commission to propose legislation implementing the human 
right to water and sanitation, as recognised by the United Nations, and to promote the 
provision of water and sanitation as essential public services for all. It will be interesting to 
see whether the Commission decides to propose a legislation or policy measure, or not to 
act at all.  
For other ECIs, the period of collection of signatures is over, but they have not (yet) 
been submitted to the Commission. Interestingly enough, one of these concerns a “Central 
public online collection platform for the European Citizen Initiative […] to enable all 
European Citizens to participate in the European politics” through a lower barrier which 
works instantly and without technical expertise.XLV This ECI demonstrates that there is a 
portion of citizens willing to make full use of this participatory tool, and willing to make it 
as open and accessible as possible. It is unclear from the proposal whether this is an 
attempt to further regulate the ECI or to amend Regulation 211/2011. It is likely that the 
organizer of this ECI just wanted the Commission to take a policy action. Hence, what the 
reaction of the Commission will be, whether the Commission will follow up on this ECI 
and whether it will pursue a legislative act, an amendment or, by contrast, whether it will 
proceed through policy action and soft law remains to be seen.  
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7. Tentative Conclusions 
 
Despite the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the dominant (although probably 
non majoritarian) picture of EU governance remains that of a “muddy” and technocratic 
process far removed from citizens. The recent economic crisis has contributed to 
reinforcing the idea of unpopular political decision taken regardless of the will of EU 
people, or even against the determination of citizens. This picture has been largely 
endorsed by the so-called anti-EU parties (mainly right-wing populist/nationalist parties), 
which claim that there is a huge and almost unbridgeable “democratic deficit”. This 
appears bold rhetoric. Whether one considers that the EU suffers from a “democratic 
deficit” depends on the factors one prioritizes when assessing the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy (Craig 2011: 30; Sadurski 2013). This paper is based on the assumption that 
there are democratic shortcomings in the EU, and that the democratic deficit still exists if 
we conceive of it as deficiency in terms of “input legitimacy”. It is also based on the 
postulation that a means of increasing “input legitimacy” in the EU is the improvement of 
citizens’ participation, and the implementation of Art.11 TEU (and Art. 10(3) TEU).  
Relying on these assumptions, and building up on the wide and varied academic 
scholarship, this article has endeavoured to highlight a double paradox. First, while EU 
institutions have opened up to citizens and CSOs, the multi-centred and heterogeneous 
forms of participation in EU governance are still insufficient and somewhat questionable in 
terms of openness and transparency. Second, Art. 11 TEU has a great significance per se, 
and Art. 10(3) TEU, as highlighted by Alemanno, “has led to a Copernican change in the 
legal nature of the participatory component of openness” (Alemanno 2014). However, up 
to now, they displayed little effects in terms of advancing the system of participation, with 
the exception of the ECI which represents the only novelty among the available 
participatory tools.  
Informal horizontal participation has been reduced to CSOs’ participation, but the brief 
discussion of consultations and civil dialogue has underlined these channels’ deficiencies. 
There is still a significant gap between what these informal participatory channels (should) 
pursue (i.e. open up the decision-making process to EU citizens and make them actors of 
EU governance) and what is actually achieved in terms of openness and transparency, and 
ultimately also in terms of “input legitimacy”. 
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To find the correct method to ensure an open and balanced channel of participation 
for citizens appears quite problematic, but it seems unescapable. As Medes underlines, 
“[b]y Treaty determination, participation is an aspect of democratic legitimacy. This 
postulates a normative shift in the way participation in EU law and governance is 
approached. Participation practices under Article 11 TEU can no longer be viewed only as 
a manifestation of participatory governance – which focuses on problem-solving capacities 
and on efficiency of regulatory decisions – but need to be assessed in the light of their 
broader democratic meaning.” (Mendes 2011b: 1859) 
If we consider the right to participate in the democratic life of the EU as a fundamental 
right, EU institutions can no longer rely on consultations and on what Abels calls 
“democratic experimentalism” (Abels 2009). A legal framework should establish both clear 
procedures for public participation, thereby enhancing transparency, and predictable rules 
on the “effects” that participatory tools display.  
Art. 11 TEU (unlike the ECI) does not require any binding law to regulate 
participation. It is also true that citizens’ participation requires a certain degree of flexibility 
and the use of different techniques and/or channels. But, even though “one fits all” does 
not seem a good solution, the soft mechanisms examined here fall short in terms of the 
requirement of openness and transparency. A legal framework, though leaving a certain 
degree of flexibility, should foster equal access to the public, specifying how and to what 
extent outcomes of participatory processes influence decision-making processes.  
There has been a failure on the part of EU institutions in avoiding any opportunity to 
regulate these channels. The TR is a puzzling example of how the lack of any binding act 
and mandatory registration undermines the very objective of the registry itself. 
Horizontal and vertical participation has also taken the form of advisory committees 
(CoR and EESC). These committees bring together civil society organizations and the EU: 
they are well-rooted bodies, but their contribution in terms of input legitimacy is still 
limited, though not negligible.  
The ECI is the only channel that has been regulated and proceduralized. Leaving aside 
participatory experiments, it is also the first participatory channel really dictated to EU 
citizens uti singuli. Some scholars contend that the ECI will eventually empower more CSOs 
than citizens, because only CSOs have the resources and network necessary to produce the 
required number of signatures (Smith 2012: 289). This is not without truth, but “the ECI 
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does provide a new avenue for citizen engagement” (Smith 2012: 285). Regardless of any 
criticism that can be directed at Regulation 211/2011, if put into practice, the ECI has 
great potential to increase EU “input legitimacy”. 
Overall, although, as affirmed by the German Constitutional Court in its Lisbon Treaty 
decision, the mere deliberative participation of citizens and CSOs cannot replace the 
legitimizing of connections based on elections and other votes,XLVI the lesson that could be 
learnt from all these participatory instruments is that they could and should complement 
representative democracy. EU institutions probably should engage more in creating 
participatory tools, not in continuing the democratic experimentalism but through building 
upon the experience gained, regulating where possible what already exists. 
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